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CIVIL PROCEDURE: A GENERALLY WELL-LIT PATH
THROUGH THE FEDERAL COURTS
RICHARD J. O'BRIEN, JR.*

During the Seventh Circuit's 1980-81 term, the court decided
many cases that resolved questions pertaining to civil procedure in the
federal courts. The cases which are discussed below were chosen because they either resolved novel questions or rendered decisions that
departed from past precedent in some fashion. Only a few of the cases
selected are potentially of national note. For purposes of the following
discussion, they have been grouped into five broad subject areas of civil
procedure: access to the district courts, pretrial practice, trial practice,
choice of law determinations and appellate jurisdiction.
ACCESS TO THE DISTRICT COURTS

Whether a federal forum will be provided for the resolution of a
dispute is a question that could concern a variety of disparate issues of
civil procedure. This section addresses recent Seventh Circuit cases
concerning original subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction
and statutes of limitations.
OriginalSubject Matter Jurisdiction
Stated simply, original subject matter jurisdiction refers to the
power of a court to take cognizance of a controversy from the time of
its commencement and to resolve it in the first instance. Fundamental
to federalism is the principle that federal courts are courts of limited
subject matter jurisdiction.' Subject matter jurisdiction may not be
waived or conferred by the parties, nor will it be affected by estoppel
principles. 2 Within the immutable boundaries of federal judicial power
drawn by the Constitution, the contours of federal subject matter juris3
diction are shaped by Congress.
Associate, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois. Former Law Clerk to Honorable Abraham
*
Lincoln Marovitz, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. B.A., St.
Louis University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). See generally C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (1976).
2. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379, 383-84 (1884).
3. Article three of the Constitution is the source of judicial power, providing, inter alia, that
that power shall extend only to actual cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. 3. Further, article
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Of the few cases of note decided by the Seventh Circuit this term
that raised issues concerning subject matter jurisdiction, none touched
upon the constitutional limitations of that jurisdiction. Further, those
decisions discussed below do not represent any significant departure
from prior Seventh Circuit law with regard to the statutory limitations
upon federal jurisdiction. The cases discussed are nonetheless worthy
of note as indicated below.
Two of the cases indicate that statutory jurisdictional restrictions
upon the exercise of federal power may be overridden by what the Seventh Circuit perceives to be the important concerns underlying the
availability of class actions. The first of these cases, Air Line Stewards
& Stewardesses Association, Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,4
involves a decade of class litigation brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 5 challenging TWA's policy of terminating female flight attendants once they became mothers. The jurisdictional issue presented in Air Line Stewards was whether the district
court had the power to approve a settlement of all claims after the Seventh Circuit had determined in an earlier appeal that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over more than ninety percent of the
claims. That issue was framed by the somewhat convoluted procedural
path taken by the litigation prior to approval of the settlement by the
district court. In In re ConsolidatedPretrialProceedings in the Airline
Cases,6 the district court's grant of summary judgment to the class
members was reversed because ninety-two percent of the class members had not filed their charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 7 within ninety days 8 of the alleged
discriminatory action, a requirement that the Seventh Circuit ruled to
be jurisdictional. 9 The Seventh Circuit's mandate was stayed, however,
pending consideration by the United States Supreme Court of the parties' certiorari petitions. Meanwhile, the parties entered into a settlethree defines the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and limits the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts. Id Within those limitations, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is largely defined
by Congress. See generaly I MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60[3] (2d ed. 1981).
4. 630 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980), afrd, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982). See p. 386 infra.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
6. 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982). See p. 386 infra.
7. Hereinafter referred to as EEOC.
8. When the.Air Line Stewards action was filed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1976) required that
a Title VII claim be filed within 90 days of the allegedly discriminatory act to be subject to redress
under Title VII. Subsequently, Title VII's EEOC filing requirement was amended to extend the
time limit to 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. III 1979).
9. 582 F.2d at 1151.
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ment of the claims before the district court. 10 Thereafter, the labor
organization representing current TWA flight attendants, the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, filed an appeal from the settlement order, raising the jurisdictional question stated above.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's order approving the
settlement. The Seventh Circuit's ruling derives from its characterization of the question of whether the EEOC filing requirement is jurisdictional as an "unsettled" one and, given that characterization, its
perception of the policies favoring the settlement of class actions and
the weight it assigned to those policies. " The court's reasoning appears
to be weak in two important respects. First, the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the nature of the EEOC filing requirement as being "unsettled" is exceedingly deferential to the minority view holding that it is
not jurisdictional.' 2 It is now well settled law in the Seventh Circuit
that the EEOC filing requirement is jurisdictional.' 3 Moreover, while
the Supreme Court has arguably never expressly held the EEOC filing
requirement to be jurisdictional, it has repeatedly referred to it as

such.

14

Beyond the question of whether the jurisdictional nature of the
EEOC filing requirement is "unsettled," there is the more fundamental
question of whether uncertainties over a federal court's subject matter
jurisdiction should trigger the policy considerations which attend the
settlement of class actions. Settlements are entered into so that litigants
may avoid the "uncertainties of outcome in litigation, as well as . . .
wasteful litigation and expense."' 5 For those reasons, courts generally
favor the settlement of actions, particularly class actions. 16 As previously stated, however, subject matter jurisdiction may neither be
waived nor conferred by the parties. Further, a federal court is bound
10. At the parties' request, the Supreme Court deferred consideration of the certiorari petitions so that their settlement discussions could be completed. 630 F.2d at 1166.
11. Id at 1167-69. The Seventh Circuit has in the past indicated that class action procedure
is often a preferred vehicle for the resolution of Title VII issues. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498
(5th Cir. 1968). For a critique of that view, see Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L.
REv. 688 (1980).
12. For a sampling of the decisions that have decided the question, see 630 F.2d at 1168 n.2.
13. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1151 (7th
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (1982); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th
Cir. 1969).
14. Eg., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 556 n.8 (1977); Alexander v.'GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
15. Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1976) (quoting Florida Trailer & Equip.
Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960)).
16. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1980).
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to conclusively resolve questions pertaining to its subject matter jurisdiction whenever they arise and as soon as they arise.1 7 Therefore, it
would seem to be quite a different matter to uphold a court-approved
settlement predicated upon uncertainties as to the merits of an action
than to uphold a court-approved settlement predicated upon uncertainties as to the court's power to entertain the action. The Seventh Circuit
inAir Line Stewards expressly declined to draw such a distinction, stating that "the principles favoring settlement of class action lawsuits relegal issues center on
main the same regardless of whether the disputed
8
action."'
the
over
court
the
the jurisdiction of
In Appleton Electric Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc.,'9 the Seventh

Circuit was again faced with a jurisdictional question presented by a
statutory filing requirement deemed to be jurisdictional. Appleton was
an action brought under the Interstate Commerce Act 20 seeking the recovery of certain overcharges from a defendant class on behalf of a
class of plaintiffs. The Interstate Commerce Act contains certain time
limitations for the filing of actions thereunder 2 ' which have been determined to be jurisdictional. 22 The issue presented in Appleton was
whether jurisdiction existed over the claims against a particular defendant class member when that defendant did not receive notice of the
Sevaction until after the expiration of the statutory time period. The
23
claim.
a
such
over
exist
does
jurisdiction
that
enth Circuit held
Appleton clearly illuminates the importance that the Seventh Circuit often attaches to the purposes underlying class actions. Those purposes are, in short, "litigative efficiency and economy."' 24 The Seventh
17. See, e.g., Uptown People's Community Health Servs. Bd. of Directors v. Board of
Comm'rs, 647 F.2d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 1981).
18. 630 F.2d at 1169. In failing to make the distinction, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
position of the Fifth Circuit as articulated in McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276

(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc; per curiam). While the Seventh Circuit made some attempt to distinguish McArthur by pointing out that in that case no member of the class had met Title VII's
filing requirement, it also voiced its disapproval of McArthur's holding. Therefore, the fact that
some of the class members in Air Line Stewards had satisfied the EEOC filing requirement was
apparently of no importance to the Seventh Circuit's decision. The Fifth Circuit itself has questioned its holding in McArthur, finding the word "jurisdictional" to have been used too loosely.
Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit now
recognizes, along with many other circuits, that the filing requirements of Title VII and similar
statutes are subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., Oaxaco v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir.
1981) (Title VII); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 591-92 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. III 1979)).
19. 635 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981).
20. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (Supp. III 1979) (amended 1980).
21. Id. § 11706 (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 16(3)).
22. See Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356 (1943).
23. 635 F.2d at 609.
24. Id (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556 (1974)). The mod-
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Circuit's analysis in Appleton implicitly recognizes that, while the limitation period of the Interstate Commerce Act is deemed to be jurisdictional, its underlying purposes are basically those shared by all
limitation periods, :e., that litigation must come to an end and should
be conducted before evidence becomes stale. 25 In the context of an individual civil rights action, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that a "John
Doe" defendant not specifically named within the limitation period
could assert the statute of limitations as a defense. 26 However, in Appleton, the considerations underlying periods of limitation were directly pitted against the considerations in support of class actions, and
27
the Seventh Circuit in that context found the latter to be paramount.
In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit relied in part upon the Supreme
Court's decision inAmerican Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.28 American Ppe held that the filing of a class action on behalf of unnamed
plaintiffs tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to each unnamed
plaintiff until either class certification is denied or, if granted, he
chooses to opt out of the class as certified. 29 The Seventh Circuit
viewed the teaching of American Ppe as support for its Appleton holding inasmuch as it gave preference to the effective prosecution of a class
action over a rigid application of a statute of limitations. 30 As the Seventh Circuit recognized, however, American Ppe was not dispositive of
the question raised in Appleton, a question that before the Seventh Circuit's decision in Appleton had not been confronted by a court of appeals.3 ' American Pipe does not severely frustrate the purposes of
limitation periods since defendants have been placed on notice within
the limitation period that they will have to defend an action that may
be litigated by a class of yet unnamed plaintiffs. As a result, they
32
should endeavor to preserve and collect evidence in their defense.
ern class action is, however, coming under increasing attack both by other courts and commentators. See generaly Miller, OfFrankensteinMonsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 -ARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).
25. 635 F.2d at 609. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
26. Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cit. 1978).
27. 635 F.2d at 609-10.
28. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
29. Id at 551.
30. 635 F.2d at 609.
31. The only decision discovered by the Seventh Circuit that had addressed the question was
Chevalier v. Baird Sav. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976), which held that a statute of limitations is not tolled against unnamed members of a defendant class unless and until they are specifically named in an amended complaint.
32. American Poie is criticized in several respects in Note, Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 106 (1981).
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Appleton, on the other hand, posed a direct and unavoidable conflict
between the purposes of limitation periods and class actions.
The Seventh Circuit's tilting of the scales in favor of the purpose to
be served by class actions appears to be significantly influenced by
pragmatic considerations. The Seventh Circuit persuasively reasoned
that actions against a defendant class would be effectively eliminated
and the dockets of federal courts significantly increased if a limitation
period is not tolled as to a defendant class member until he receives
notice of the suit.33 Such a ruling would cause plaintiffs seeking to sue
a class of defendants to file and prosecute numerous protective suits
until a determination regarding class certification could be made.
Whether the rule announced by the Seventh Circuit will ultimately
gain acceptance by the other courts of appeals remains to be seen. In
any event, Appleton represents an able handling of a difficult and novel
question.
The final Seventh Circuit decision to be discussed concerning the
area of subject matter jurisdiction is Uptown People's Community
Health Services Board of Directors v. Board of Commissioners.34 Uptown was an action asserting both state and federal claims against state
and federal defendants. After a trial in federal district court on the
state claims against the state defendants, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on those claims and the state defendants
appealed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that, because none of
the federal claims asserted were substantial, the trial court erred in ex35
ercising pendent jurisdiction over the state claims.
While Uptown is largely based on settled law, it is noteworthy because of its implications with respect to the unsettled question of
whether a federal court may append a state law claim against one defendant to a federal claim asserted against another defendant. Lower
federal courts are divided as to whether such pendent party jurisdiction
is a proper invocation of the modem doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as
first articulated in UnitedAine Workers ofAmerica v. Gibbs.36 In past
decisions, the Seventh Circuit has indicated, albeit equivocally, that
pendent party jurisdiction is not a proper exercise of federal subject
33. 635 F.2d at 610. But see Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1980) (expressing
disapproval of use of class action procedure against a defendant class).
34. 647 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1981).
35. Id at 739.
36. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). For a survey of the division among the federal courts that have
decided the question, see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 713-14 n.29-30 (1973). See
generaly Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts.- A Revised Rationalefor Pendent Jurisdiclion, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 245 (1980); 28 DRAKE L. REV. 758 (1979).
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matter jurisdiction,37 and a recent Supreme Court decision voices unfavorable pronouncements on the exercise of pendent party
38
jurisdiction.
In Uptown, however, the Seventh Circuit, after determining that
no substantial federal claim was pleaded against the state defendant,
proceeded to ascertain whether a substantial federal claim was asserted
against the federal defendant without ever broaching the pendent party

jurisdiction question, 39 a question that, logically speaking, should be
addressed first. Whether Uptown assumed the availability of pendent
party jurisdiction and therefore represents a departure from the Seventh Circuit's earlier disapproval of pendent party jurisdiction is uncertain. Its implications, however, do promise to make somewhat muddier
the waters surrounding the court's already unclear position on the propriety of pendent party jurisdiction. 4°
PersonalJurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is the judicial power to render a judgment
against a person. 4 1 Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, principles of
waiver and estoppel do apply to personal jurisdiction. 42 Two kinds of
constraints are placed upon a court's jurisdiction over persons. The
outer reaches of personal jurisdiction are constitutionally defined by
the due process clause which requires that a person have such "mini37. See, e.g., U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1979);
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974);
Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965). But
see United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 482 F. Supp. 541, 545-47 (N.D. InI. 1979).
38. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
39. 647 F.2d at 738.
40. Other decisions of note pertaining to original subject matter jurisdiction that were rendered this last term by the Seventh Circuit include: McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458
(7th Cir. 1981) (federal securities law claims not so insubstantial as to preclude assertion of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims); Precision Shooting Equip. Co. v. Allen, 646 F.2d 313 (7th
Cir. 1981) (actual controversy exists as to declaratory judgment action filed by patent licensee
challenging validity of patent because the licensee is entitled to determination as to whether it is
required to continue paying patent royalties); Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 635 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980) (actual controversy exists where plaintiffs political conduct
chilled due to the parties' disagreement as to interpretation of Federal Election Campaign Act);
City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 633 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1980) (abstention in action challenging Indiana
Takeover Act on constitutional grounds appropriate where pending state court action may result
in interpretation of the act that will render it constitutional); International Harvester Co. v. Deere
& Co., 623 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) (no actual controversy exists over a declaratory judgment
action challenging the validity of a patent unless the owner of the patent has instilled in the plaintiff a reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit).
41. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), oterruledon other grounds, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977).
42. See, e.g., Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 543 (3d Cir.
1967). See generally 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 4.02[31 (2d ed. 1981).
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mum contacts" with a forum so that the forum's exercise of jurisdiction
over him does not offend traditional notions of fairness and substantial
clause,
justice. 4 3 Within the limitations imposed by the due process 44
state statutory law is free to impose more stringent limitations.
Recent years have witnessed a slight retreat from the somewhat
expansive view of preceding years with respect to the due process limitations placed upon personal jurisdiction. 45 The few decisions rendered by the Seventh Circuit this term signal no further developments
in this area. The decisions noted below are nonetheless of some interest because of their application of personal jurisdiction principles to
some rather unique factual circumstances.
Perhaps the most interesting personal jurisdiction question
presented to the Seventh Circuit this term was that in Koster v.
Automark Industries,Inc.46 Koster was an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff that was based upon a default judgment
obtained by the plaintiff against the defendant in a contract action
commenced in the Netherlands. The record in Koster indicated that
the defendant's only contacts with the Netherlands were several letters
and wire communications with the plaintiff prior to the execution of a
sales contract in Milan, Italy. No delivery or payment was ever made
under the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the district court on due process grounds, finding that the defendant had insufficient contacts with the Netherlands to vest that forum with
47
personal jurisdiction over it.
The Seventh Circuit in Koster recognized the salient principle of
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant foreign company
to be "whether the company 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.' ",48 In making this
determination in Koster, the Seventh Circuit drew heavily upon its recent opinion in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.49 In Koster, as in Lakeside, the court noted that the
43. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
44. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
45. See Louis, The Grasp fLong Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach. A Comment on

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. REV. 407 (1980);
Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: A Limit to the Expansion fLong-Arm Jurisdiction,
46.
47.
48.

69 CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1981).
640 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981).
Id at 79.
Id at 78 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).

49. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979). For a rather sharp criticism of the Lakeside decision (which
seems to have lost some of its force after the Supreme Court's decision in World- Wide Volkswagen), see Note, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.: Inflexible
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recognition of personal jurisdiction solely upon the basis of business
communications into a forum would virtually erase the bounds placed
upon personal jurisdiction by the due process clause. 50 Further reiterating principles enunciated in Lakeside, the Koster court remarked that
to give effect to the Netherlands' exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant would "improperly impinge upon the interests of other
states by trying in its courts a case with which it has no adequate relationship." 5' The court also noted that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was not supportable by reference to any
contacts of the defendant with the Netherlands other than those per52
taining to the particular transaction underlying the suit.
In a factual setting presenting a stronger case for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction, Nu- Way Systems of Indianapolis,Inc. v. Belmont
Marketing, Inc. ,3 the Seventh Circuit declined to find personal jurisdiction over defendant Service Finance Company. The transaction underlying Nu- Way was a contract for Nu-Way to assign to Service
Finance, in consideration for capital funds, Nu-Way's accounts receivable generated by its installment sales of retail merchandise to Indiana
consumers. The contract provided that the assignments were with full
recourse against Nu-Way should a customer of Nu-Way default on the
sales contract. The contract was solicited, negotiated and executed in
Illinois. At the time of the lawsuit, Service Finance had been assigned
several hundred contracts.
On the basis of these facts, the Seventh Circuit again held that the
defendant had not "'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities'" in the forum state.5 4 The court rejected arguments that Nu-Way's performance under the contract was to take place
in Indiana or that Service Finance derived substantial benefit from any
services supplied in Indiana. 55 The court reasoned that any service
56
supplied by Service Finance was supplied to Nu-Way in Illinois.
Application of Long-Arm JurisdictionStandardsto the Nonresident Purchaser,75 Nw. U. L. REV.

345 (1980). See also Gallagher, Civil Procedure- Access to the District Courts, Suitability of the
Forum, and Appellate Jurisdictionand Procedure, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 103, 127-28 (1980).
50. 640 F.2d at 79.
51. Id at 79-80 (quoting Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597
F.2d at 603).
52. 640 F.2d at 80. In Lakeside, the Seventh Circuit had stated that where the defendant's
business contacts with the forum state do not involve dangerous activity, the determination as to
minimum contacts should be made in light of any contacts of the defendant with the forum other
than those related to the lawsuit. 597 F.2d at 603.
53. 635 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1980).

54. Id at 620 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
55. 635 F.2d at 620-21.
56. Id at 621.
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The final Seventh Circuit decision this term to be discussed in the
context of personal jurisdiction is Casas v. Royal Bank of Canada.5 7
The question of personal jurisdiction presented in Casas was whether
the activities conducted from defendant's Chicago office were sufficient
to subject it to jurisdiction under Illinois' long-arm statute and the due
58
process clause. The pertinent provision of Illinois' long-arm statute
had been interpreted by Illinois courts to permit service upon a foreign
corporation only if the activity of the corporation in Illinois giving rise
to the lawsuit constituted more than the "mere solicitation" of
business.5 9
The defendant in Casas was a Canadian banking corporation with
an office in Chicago. While the defendant maintained that its Chicago
office conducts no "banking business," the Seventh Circuit noted that
the Chicago office performs a wide range of ancillary services for customers of the bank residing in the midwest. 60 The Seventh Circuit
noted that the record showed that the defendant's employees assigned
to the Chicago office facilitate "the solicitation of new business, the ex'6
pansion of present business and the retention of existing accounts." '
Given these factual findings, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
defendant's Chicago offices were engaged in more than the "mere solicitation" of business and, in addition, that its presence in Illinois satis62
fied due process requirements.
Statutes of Limitations
This section reviews several decisions involving difficult determinations by the Seventh Circuit with respect to the availability of an
applicable statute of limitations as a defense to a claim. 63 Statutes of
limitations are statutes of repose, intended to signal an end to litigation,
and also serve to further the truth-finding process of the judicial system
by helping to ensure that evidence will not have already become stale
by the time it is presented." Statutes of limitations necessarily erect a
somewhat arbitrary division between those claims that will be found
57. 625 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1980).

58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13.3 (1979) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered agent or any officer or
agent of said corporation found anywhere in the State; ...."
59. See Lindley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 407 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1968).
60. 625 F.2d at 142-43.
61. Id at 142.
62. Id at 143-44.
63. Other cases concerning statutes of limitations deemed to be jurisdictional were discussed
at notes 2-33 supra and accompanying text.
64. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
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cognizable and those that will not. Recent Seventh Circuit decisions of
note in this area largely evidence a ready willingness to eschew a formalistic interpretation of statutes of limitations when a weighing of the
applicable equities argues in favor of doing so.
Two such cases this term concerned claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 65 The first of these, McGowan v. Williams,66 was
brought under the federal drivers provisions of the FTCA which contain a six-month limitation period. 67 While the remedies provided by
the federal drivers provisions are exclusively federal, the provisions anticipate that suits will be filed in state court since the provisions require
the United States to defend such a suit when filed and to remove it to
federal court upon a determination that the claim arose while the
driver involved was acting "within the scope of his employment. ' 68
The district court interpretation of the limitation period that was challenged on appeal in McGowan provided that the period for an action
originally commenced in state court was tolled only if and when it was
removed to federal court.
The Seventh Circuit rejected this interpretation based upon its
"practical and realistic" interpretation of the statute of limitations and
upon fairness considerations. 6 9 Because the FTCA contemplates that
suits will be brought in state court, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
the filing of an action in state court should be effective to toll the limitation period.70 The court also noted that the district court's interpretation could foster unfairness in that it would permit the United States to
"sandbag" when defending actions brought in state court that were
properly removable by awaiting the expiration of the limitation period
71
before petitioning for removal.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in McGowan appears to do nothing
to frustrate the purpose of the limitation period. Because an action
originally filed in state court must be filed within the limitation period,
the United States will likely always receive actual notice of a claim
within the limitation period. Moreover, the period is sufficiently short
that any "enlargement" of it due to a rule providing that the period is
65. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). Hereinafter referred to as the FTCA.
66. 623 F.2d 1239 (7th Cit. 1980).
67. The federal drivers provisions of the FTCA are found at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)-(e) (1976).

The relevant limitation period is set forth in id § 2401(b).
68. Id § 2679(c)-(d).
69. 623 F.2d at 1243.
70. Id The Seventh Circuit did so without engaging in the legal fiction used by some courts
that views the filing of the state action as one against the United States even before removal. Id
71. Id
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tolled by the filing of a state action should not cause the United States
any significant prejudice.
In another case brought under the FTCA, Stoleson v. United
States,72 the emanations of the Seventh Circuit's opinion promise to
have some far-reaching consequences. In 1967, Stoleson worked at a
government munitions plant and was engaged in tasks that required the
handling of nitroglycerin. Shortly thereafter, she began to develop
heart problems. In 1969, Stoleson acquired knowledge suggesting that
her handling of nitroglycerin may have caused her heart problems; at
that time, however, no such causal connection had been medically
demonstrated. In 1971, a cardiologist, based in part upon his treatment
of Stoleson, published an article linking the heart ailment of which
Stoleson suffered to chronic exposure to nitroglycerin. Stoleson then
commenced her claim under the FTCA. The provision of the FTCA
under which Stoleson brought her claim is governed by a two-year limitation period. 73 The district court ruled that the limitation period
barred Stoleson's action even if a discovery rule were found applicable
because she discovered or should have discovered the elements of her
claim as soon as 1969.
In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit, in a case of first
impression within the circuit, 74 ruled that the discovery rule is not lim75
ited in its application in FTCA cases to medical malpractice claims.
It stated that "it is the nature of the problems faced by a plaintiff in
discovering his injury and its cause, and not the occupation of the defendant that governs the applicability of the discovery rule."'7 6 The
court went on to hold that "any plaintiff who is blamelessly ignorant of
the existence or cause of his injury shall be accorded the benefits of the
discovery rule."' 77 As to Stoleson's claim, the Seventh Circuit found
that she could not have discovered the cause of her injury until medical
science had demonstrated the causal link between heart disorders and
78
exposure to nitroglycerin.
The Seventh Circuit conceded that its holding would be applicable
to cases where medical science recognizes conduct to be harmful long
after that conduct was undertaken, and that consequently, in such
72. 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
74. In Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 827 n.7 (7th Cir. 1979), the court raised and
reserved the issue.
75. 629 F.2d at 1268.
76. Id at 1269.
77. Id
78. Id at 1270.
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cases, the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is to protect
against the bringing of stale claims, would be thwarted. 79 The decision
reached by the Seventh Circuit is nonetheless a proper one. The discovery rule in any context poses the potential for the bringing of stale
claims. The rule simply reflects the considered judgment that the unfairness to an injured party who through no fault of her own is unaware
of the elements of her injury is greater than the unfairness of requiring
a wrongdoer to defend a stale claim.80 Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Stoleson, the possible instances of the bringing of
stale claims upon the basis of some medical advancement are, as a
practical matter, likely to be few because, as in Stoleson, the defendant
8
will have violated some preexisting duty to the plaintiff. '
In .JH Cohn & Co. v. American AppraisalAssociates, Inc. ,82 where
the court invoked the doctrine of estoppel to preclude the assertion of a
statute of limitations defense, the Seventh Circuit again displayed a
preference toward class actions. The plaintiff in J.- Cohn had filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York asserting classwide allegations of violations of the federal
securities laws. That action was transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) 83 to the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Wisconsin upon the New York district court's receipt of the defendant's assurance that the Wisconsin statute of limitations would not be
asserted as a defense to the action if it were transferred. After transfer
of the action, the Wisconsin district court denied the motion for class
certification. Persons who had anticipated becoming class members in
the action then commenced a separate action in the Wisconsin district
court asserting essentially the same claims as had been asserted in the
other action. That second action was dismissed upon the defendant's
assertion of the Wisconsin statute of limitations. The plaintiffs in the
second action appealed the district court's order dismissing the
complaint.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the defendant was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations since its representation
79. Id at 1271.
80. See, e.g., Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-70 (1949).
81 . In Stoleson, the record disclosed that the defendant had failed to observe its own safety
regulations concerning the handling of nitroglycerin-regulations promulgated because of the
danger of injury other than that ultimately suffered by Stoleson. 629 F.2d at 1271 n.6.
82. 628 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1980).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.
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in the New York district court that it would not assert the Wisconsin
statute of limitations misled the putative class members to their detriment.8 4 Their reliance was to their detriment because they had forfeited their opportunity to bring an action in New York district court
within that state's limitation period. Further, their reliance was justifiable because the defendant was on notice at the time of its representation that it might well have to defend itself against classwide claims.
The Seventh Circuit's application of the doctrine of estoppel in
.JHCohn was certainly correct given the facts of that case. 85 The appellants' reliance was reasonable in light of the status of the class certification question at the time of the defendant's representation and its
failure to limit the reach of its representation to the individual plaintiff.
Moreover, as stressed by the court, the .JH Cohn holding was buttressed by the policies of efficient and economical administration of justice that underlie class action procedure.8 6 A contrary holding would
have meant that possibly unnecessary individual suits would have to
have been filed by all putative class members pending resolution of the
class certification question to ensure the preservation of their claims,
87
the very sort of result that the class action procedure seeks to avoid.
The final decision warranting discussion concerning statutes of
limitations is Slumler v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co. ,88 which involves Indiana's four-year statute of limitations for claims brought on express warranties arising under that state's enacted version of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 89 The statute provides that the limitation period
begins to run upon delivery unless the express warranty explicitly extends to future performance. 90 The plaintiffs claim was based upon his
purchase of tomato seeds which failed to produce a harvest that conformed to representations made in the defendant's sales brochures.
The district court found that the defendant's express warranties did not
extend to future performance and accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs
action because it was brought over four years after delivery of the seed.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in a split decision, noting that its initial sympathy for the plaintiffs position was tempered by
the fact that the plaintiff waited well over three years after harvest of
84. 628 F.2d at 1000.
85. For a general discussion of the doctrine of estoppel, see Saverslak v. Davis-Cleaver Pro-

duce Co., 606 F.2d 208, 213 (7th Cir. 1979), cen. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
86. 628 F.2d at 1001.
87. Id See also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1978).
88. 644 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
89. IND. CODE §§ 26-1-1-101 to 26-1-10-106 (1976).
90. Id § 26-1-2-725(2).
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the non-conforming fruit before bringing his action. 9 1
As the dissent convincingly argued, the majority's decision seems
to reach an incorrect result. 92 The defendant's brochures described the
seed as producing a fruit of a certain "size, maturity, shape, firmness,
and color." 93 Those representations would appear to extend to future
performance in explicit fashion. This conclusion is also supported by
common sense: defects in seed can generally only be discovered upon
harvest. While the plaintiff may well have been less than diligent in
bringing his claim, the rule enunciated by the majority is nonetheless
incorrect for the simple reason that it cannot in any principled manner
be distinguished from cases based upon similar warranty language that
94
are more diligently prosecuted.
PRETRIAL PRACTICE

For purposes of the following discussion, "pretrial practice" shall
mean the motion practice and discovery that takes place from the time
of filing an action until it goes to trial, if indeed it does. So defined, the
purposes of pretrial procedure under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce95
dure are to facilitate the discovery of information relevant to a claim,
to dispose of claims that are both insufficient on their face 96 and claims
that raise only legal issues, 97 and to define and narrow the issues pertinent to those claims that are ultimately tried. 98 In short, pretrial practice is intended to efficiently guide a claim to a fair resolution.
Decisions of note rendered by the Seventh Circuit in its 1980-81 term
concern three aspects of pretrial practice: pleading, discovery and summary judgment.
91. 644 F.2d at 669.
92. Id at 669-70 (Bonsai, J., dissenting).
93. Id at 669.
94. Another decision of the Seventh Circuit rendered this term concerning statutes of limitations is Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1980) (statute of limitations of Wisconsin
securities act applicable to rule lOb-5 actions brought in Wisconsin rather than the state's limitation period for common law fraud actions).
Also deciding a question relevant to access to the district courts was the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Brown v. Grimm, 624 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1980) (when an action is brought in a forum
clearly without personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it is within the district court's discretion
to deny the defendant's motion to transfer even though the limitation period of the proposed
transferee forum has expired).
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
96. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
98. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16.
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Pleading
The basic rules of pleading in the federal courts are found in rules
7 through 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules establish a system of notice pleading and are otherwise framed so as to
achieve the goal of disposition of claims on their merits rather than by
way of procedural default. 99 Toward that goal, the rules provide that
"[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. ' 100
This term's decisions of the Seventh Circuit concerning rules of
pleading largely honor that standard of construction. None of the decisions represent either such a departure from precedent or the resolution
of a novel question as to promise to become of national significance.
Nonetheless, each decision selected for brief discussion below contains
rulings meriting some attention.
Maclin v. Paulson,1 1 a civil rights action commenced under section 1983,102 is significant in two respects. First, it rejects the argument
that civil rights claims should be held to a more stringent standard of
pleading than other sorts of claims.' 0 3 That argument is often made by
civil rights defendants. No doubt it possesses some appeal to district
courts whose overcrowded dockets are increasingly composed of civil
rights matters, more than a few of which are without merit. To be sure,
the argument has no basis in either the federal rules or in any of the
civil rights statutes. Nonetheless, it has gained acceptance by at least
one court of appeals. 1°4 Before Maclin, the Seventh Circuit had not
squarely rejected the argument.
Maclin is also significant in that it rejects an argument to disallow
the naming of "John Doe" defendants in a complaint. 10 5 Indeed, the
court encouraged the naming of John Doe defendants where the actual
names of the defendants are unavailable to the plaintiff without the
advantage of some discovery.1o6 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit rejected a contrary position held by the Ninth Circuit. 107 The use of John
Doe defendants arms civil rights plaintiffs with an important proce99. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). See generally C. WRiGHT, LAW OF
68 (1976).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(0.
101. 627 F.2d-83 (7th Cir. 1980).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
103. 627 F.2d at 86.
104. See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976).
105. The court noted that "the use of fictitious names for defendants has been routinely approved even without discussion." 627 F.2d at 87 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
106. 627 F.2d at 87.
107. See Wiltsie v. California Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1960).
FEDERAL COURTS §
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dural weapon for the prosecution of civil rights claims, particularly
those arising from misconduct of law enforcement officials. Often one
whose civil rights have been abridged as a result of official misconduct
will not know the names of all of the officials involved. Under the rule
allowing the naming of John Doe defendants, such a plaintiff is assured
that he will be able to employ the courts and the discovery process to
08
help discover the names of involved officials.
Merrill Tenant Council v. UnitedStates Department of Housingand
Urban Development 109 presented the question of whether a sua sponte
dismissal of a claim without notice or hearing violated either the federal rules or the due process clause." 0 The court ruled that the sua
sponte dismissal was reversible error because the claim dismissed was
not apparently insufficient on its face,"' thereby avoiding the due process question. The court thus implied that the federal rules allow sua
sponte dismissals of claims on nonjurisdictional grounds." 2 That implied proposition, however, has no support in the rules." 13 Rather it
seems to reflect the practical judgment that to reverse the sua sponte
dismissal of a claim that is plainly insufficient on its face so that notice
and a hearing can be provided would foster the wasteful expenditure of
14
judicial resources."
Another due process challenge based upon a district court's failure
to adhere to the rules of pleading presented itself in Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc. 115 There the district court
construed a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and ruled
upon the motion without affording the parties the notice required by
rule 12(b)." 6 The court held that the proponent of the due process
108. It must be noted, however, that if a John Doe defendant is not specifically named within
the limitation period, the claim will be time-barred. Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
109. 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1981).
110. In Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 905 (1978), the Seventh Circuit held that a =a sponte dismissal of a plainly insufficient
claim which was preceded by a "preliminary opinion" indicating that dismissal would be forthcoming was not violative of the due process clause. 565 F.2d at 1202.
111. 638 F.2d at 1094.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) authorizes the sua spon'e dismissal of a claim based upon a
jurisdictional defect. See Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 997 (1977).
113. See Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1969); Harmon v. Superior Court, 307
F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1962).
114.

Cf. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1347 (1969)

(noting that the purpose of rule 12(b) of the federal rules is to promote the expeditious and simultaneous presentation of defenses and objections).
115. 639 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1981).
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides in pertinent part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
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argument could prevail upon that argument only if the summary judgment ruling was inappropriate either because the record disclosed a
factual dispute or the adverse party demonstrated that it could have
raised a factual dispute if given the opportunity. 1 7 Therefore, because
the appellant did not assert on appeal the existence of any factual dispute, the Seventh Circuit refused to reverse the district court's decision
based upon the appellant's due process argument." l8 While the Sev-

enth Circuit disapproved of the district court's failure to observe the
notice provision of rule 12(b), 119 the Seventh Circuit's decision again
reflects a practical judgment that seeks to avoid the futile use of judicial
resources.
The final two decisions dealing with the rules of pleading concern
the "relation back" of amended pleadings to the time of filing of the

original pleading to bring the amended pleading within the applicable
limitation period. 20 The first, Norton v. InternationalHarvester Co. ,121
was a products liability action involving a tractor-trailer manufactured
by International Harvester. The plaintiff sought the relation back of an
amendment which added TRW, Inc., a manufacturer-supplier of the
steering wheel of the tractor-trailer, as a defendant in her action. The
Seventh Circuit's settled interpretation of rule 15(c)' 22 imposes three
requirements 23 that must be met before an amendment adding a defendant will be permitted to relate back to avoid the effect of an expired
limitation period: (1) the claim alleged in the amended complaint
must arise out of the same occurrence set forth in the original pleadings; (2) within the period provided by law for commencing the action
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.
117. 639 F.2d at 391-92.
118. Id
119. Id at 391. See also Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 434
U.S. 997 (1977).
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), which provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing
provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
121. 627 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1980).
122. See note 120 supra.
123. See Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973).
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against him, the party to be substituted by amendment must have received such "notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits"; 24 and (3) the
party to be substituted by amendment knew or should have known
that, but for a "mistake" concerning the identity of the proper party,
the suit would have been brought against him. The district court allowed the amendment, but the Seventh Circuit reversed because it
found that the plaintiffs amendment2 5failed to pass muster under both
the second and third requirements.
Because the facts of Norton clearly do indicate that the plaintiffs
failure to name TRW as a defendant within the limitation period was
not due to "mistake," the decision of the Seventh Circuit is ultimately
supportable. However, the Seventh Circuit's finding that TRW did not
receive notice of the action within the limitation period is not persuasively supported by the facts and displays a very narrow view of "notice" within the meaning of rule 15(c). Within the limitation period,
TRW was aware of the claims against International Harvester, including claims based upon the failure of the steering mechanism manufactured by TRW.' 26 The Seventh Circuit nevertheless reasoned that the
claims made by the plaintiff were "unique" to International Harvester
127
and thus afforded TRW no notice as contemplated by rule 15(c).
However, to reiterate, the Seventh Circuit's finding in this regard is
premised upon an exceedingly narrow view of rule 15(c)'s notice
28
requirement. 1
Paskuly v. MarshallField& Co. 129 involves an amendment adding
classwide claims to a Title VII action commenced in an individual capacity. Previous Seventh Circuit decisions have held that the filing of a
claim with the EEOC will toll the operation of the EEOC filing requirement as to all persons similarly situated until a judicial action is
brought and that, if the action is brought on behalf of a class, the limitation period will be further tolled until a determination of the class
certification question. 30 Thus, because Paskuly commenced her action
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id
627 F.2d at 22-23.
Id at 21.
Id
Cf. Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1981), discussed at notes

129-38 infra and accompanying text. See generally 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
ed. 1981).

15.15131 (2d

129. 646 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
130. See Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 n.6 (1976), a 'dmem. sub
non United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969).
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in an individual capacity, the size of the putative class embraced by her
subsequently added class allegations depended upon whether her class
allegations related back to the time her action was commenced.
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's order allowing the relation back of Paskuly's class allegations.1 3 ' The Seventh Circuit found, as did the district court, that
relation back was appropriate because the defendant was on notice all
along that it would have to defend against claims of a classwide nature
since both Paskuly's EEOC filing and her original complaint alleged
discrimination of a classwide nature. 132 Unfortunately, however, the

Seventh Circuit in Paskuly failed to capitalize on an opportunity to
clearly explain what requirements are imposed by rule 15(c) for the
relation back of amendments addingplaintiffs after the expiration of33a
limitation period, a question for which there is a dearth of authority. 1
Rule 15(c) and the case law decided under it with respect to the addition of party defendants have little literal application to amendments
adding partyplaintiffs. 34 The authority which exists provides that the
general notice principles underlying rule 15(c) govern all relation back
questions whether they are presented by the addition of plaintiffs or
defendants. 3 5 That proposition may certainly be distilled from the
Paskuly opinion. 136 However, some clearly articulated guidelines, as
provided by the Seventh Circuit in the past with respect to the addition
of defendants,1 3 7 could have made Paskuly a more useful precedent to
38
district courts.'
131. 646 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
132. Id at 1211. See also Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 494 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. I11.1980).
133. See generally 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.15 [4.-2] (2d ed. 1980).
134. Id
135. See Staren v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976);
Unilever (Raw Materials) Ltd. v. M/T Stolt Boel, 77 F.R.D. 384, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Advisory
Comm. Note, reprinledin 39 F.R.D. 69, 82-84 (1966).
136. See 646 F.2d at 1211.
137. See Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1973).
138. Other cases in which the Seventh Circuit decided questions relating to pleading this term
include: Chicago Teachers Union v. Johnson, 639 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1980) (where claim to federal
unemployment benefits is initially reviewed by state officials but is ultimately subject to review by
responsible federal officials, the federal officials are necessary parties under rule 19(a)); Pasco Int'l
(London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1980) (former agent of plaintiff who
conspired with defendant to misappropriate plaintiffs business held not an indispensable party);
Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff suing under the FTCA may not
amend his complaint so as to add unexhausted claims), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Zaun v.
Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1980) (where a plaintiff seeking to file an action informapauerif
refused to complete standardized financial form required by local rules and submitted only generalized averments of indigency, district court properly dismissed the action); McKee-Berger-Mansueto, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 626 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1980) (not error to deny amendment of the
complaint at trial to conform to the evidence when evidence inadmissible because not adequately
plead); Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 624 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.) (not error to deny
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Discovery
The federal rules governing the discovery process are found in
rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These
rules liberally allow a party to discover material "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,"' 139 generally creating a
presumption that relevant evidence is discoverable. 140 That presumption may be overcome only upon the assertion of some overriding and
conflicting interest, such as privilege.' 4' Thus, the discovery rules operate in tandem with the rules of pleading toward the end that claims be
fairly resolved on their merits. 142
The only case decided by the Seventh Circuit this term concerning
use of the discovery process that merits attention is Wilk v. American
MedicalAssociation. 43 In Wilk, an action was brought by several chiropractors against the American Medical Association 144 alleging a nationwide conspiracy to injure the chiropractic profession. The Wilk
appeal was brought by the State of New York in its capacity as an
intervenor from a district court order denying modification of a protective order that governed certain discovery secured by the Wilk plaintiffs. While the Wilk action was pending, New York commenced a
similar action against the AMA in New York in aparenspatriaecapacity on behalf of chiropractors licensed to practice in that state. 45 Its
subsequent intervention in the Wilk action was for the sole purpose of
obtaining the use of the Wilk discovery. The modification of the protective order proposed by New York would have allowed use of the
discovery on the same terms as afforded the Wilk plantiffs under the
protective order. 46
In reversing the district court's order, the Seventh Circuit brought
its law into conformity with that of the two other federal appellate
courts that had decided the question 47 and, furthermore, clarified
some misleading statements made in an earlier Seventh Circuit decifourth amendment of complaint in midst of second trial of an action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013
(1980).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. .26(b)(1).
140. See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001
(1970).
141. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947).
142. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81 (1976).
143. 635 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1980).

144. Hereinafter referred to as AMA.
145. New York v. American Medical Ass'n, No. 79-C-1732 (E.D.N.Y., filed July 5, 1979).
146. 635 F.2d at 1297.
147. See Exparte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435 (1915); Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964).
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sion. 148 The rule articulated by the Wilk court provides that a bona
fide litigant is presumptively entitled to the benefit of discovery ob-

tained in another action concerning similar claims, even though subject
to a protective order, provided such discovery would be properly obtainable in his action through use of the discovery process. 149 Once the
party seeking such discovery establishes that his claims are bona fide

and similar, it becomes incumbent upon the party opposing discovery
to establish a valid objection to disclosure, such as irrelevancy or privilege. 150 If such an objection is established, the final determination as to
disclosure remains within the discretion of the district court and needs
15
to be guided by a balancing of the pertinent equities.

The Wilk decision furnishes a clear rule that respects the goals of
the discovery process.' 52 Because discovery should ordinarily take
53
place in public, protective orders are presumptively inappropriate.
The court stated that this presumption should have especial force
where, as in Wilk, a collateral litigant seeks to use discovery covered by
a protective order so as to avoid wasteful duplicative effort.' 54 Thus,
the Wilk decision both recognizes and furthers efficiency goals. Finally, in reaching its decision, the Wilk court declined to be bound by
language in an earlier decision, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Grady, 155 indicating that collateral litigants must meet a heavy burden
in order to modify a protective order. 56 That language, the Seventh

Circuit noted, is not properly derived from the facts or holding of
Grady.

t57

148. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 971 (1979).
149. 635 F.2d at 1299.
150. Id at 1301.
151. Id at 1299.
152. See generally Note, Nonparty Access to Discovery Materials in the Federal Courts, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1093-94 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Nonparly Access].
153. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338, 340 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
154. 635 F.2d at 1299. It is noteworthy that the AMA obtained the protective order in Wilk
without objection from the plaintiffs. Id at 1298. See Nonparty Access, supra note 152, at 108990.
155. 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
156. Id at 597.
157. 635 F.2d at 1300. For a valid criticism of Grady's apparent burden allocation, see Nonparty Access, supra note 152, at 1091-92.
Another decision of the Seventh Circuit rendered this term concerning the discovery process
was Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R., 653 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir. 1980) (not error to prohibit
expert witness from giving opinion testimony when adverse party was not notified that the witness
would be called to testify until after the passage of a reasonable discovery date set by the court),
cert. denied,450 U.S. 922 (1981).
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Summary Judgment
One Seventh Circuit decision rendered this term is worthy of mention because of its apparent deviation from established notions of summary judgment procedure. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly requires, and courts have consistently held, that
summary judgment may only be granted when the record discloses
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 15 8 Stated differently, the only permissible consideration as to the availability of
summary judgment is whether there exists a genuine and material factual dispute. 15 9
In Weit v. ContinentalIllinois NationalBank & Trust Co. ,160 the
Seventh Circuit, in a split decision, affirmed the district court's award
of summary judgment to the defendants in a complex antitrust trial for
which a jury demand had been made. While the Seventh Circuit cor16
rectly noted the standard applicable to summary judgment motions, '
in virtually the same breath it embarked upon a discussion of the difficulty and impracticality of trying complex antitrust cases before a
jury. 162 Thereafter, while sifting through the record of the case, the
Seventh Circuit appeared at times to be weighing facts in order to sup63
port the district court's award of summary judgment.
This sort of apparent ad hoc judicial relaxation of the requirements of summary judgment for complex antitrust cases finds no support in rule 56 or applicable case law. As Chief Judge Fairchild noted
in his dissent, the fact that a question may be difficult for a jury to
grasp and resolve is immaterial to the propriety of summary judgment
relief.I6 Indeed, the Supreme Court long ago counseled against the
availability of summary judgment in antitrust cases given the role questions of intent and motive customarily play in the resolution of those
cases.' 65 Further, Weit represents not only an unauthorized circumvention of the requirements of rule 56, but also, and perhaps more im158. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See, e.g., Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 295 F.2d 573, 576
(7th Cir. 1961).
159. See Central Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 626 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir.
1980).
160. 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981).
161. Id at 461.
162. Id at 464.
163. See id at 464-66.
164. Id at 470 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting).
165. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). For a discussion of the role of summary judgment procedure in antitrust conspiracy litigation, see Rogers,
Summary Judgment in Antitrust Conspiracy Litigation, 10 Loy. CH. L.J. 667 (1979).
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portantly, poses concerns of a constitutional dimension because the
166
plaintiff was denied his right to a trial.
TRIAL PRACTICE

Three decisions of the Seventh Circuit this term relate to the trial
of actions, including the disposition of posttrial motions, and deserve
comment. The first of these, Pinto Trucking Service, Inc. v. Motor Dispatch, Inc. ,'167 involved the offensive use of collateral estoppel by a
plaintiff to preclude a defendant from relitigating a question that the
defendant has already litigated unsuccessfully. 16 8 Pinto Trucking was
an antitrust conspiracy action brought against six defendants. When
the action was first tried, two of the defendants were granted motions
for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs case. The plaintiff
ultimately prevailed as to the other four defendants. On appeal, the
district court's grant of a directed verdict was reversed and a new trial
ordered as to the two defendants who had been directed out. During
the ensuing second trial, the district court granted collateral estoppel
effect to the finding made in the first trial that the other four defendants
had engaged in a conspiracy violative of the antitrust laws. Thus, the
defendants in the second trial were not permitted to argue that no conspiracy existed, only that they were not participants in it along with the
other four defendants.
On due process grounds, the Seventh Circuit reversed this use of
collateral estoppel allowed by the district court, finding that the defendants directed out of the first trial did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the conspiracy determination as to the other four
defendants. 69 That the defendants had an opportunity in the first trial
166. The due process clause ensures the right to a fair trial, see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242 (1980), and the seventh amendment guarantees the right in a civil action to a jury
trial of factual questions. See Pernell v.'Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974). The courts and
commentators are locked in a debate as to whether the due process right to a fair trial or the
seventh amendment right to a trial by jury is paramount when the two are arguably placed at odds
due to the complexity of an action. See Note, Complex Civil Litigatiorn Reconciling the Demandr
of Due Process with the Right to Trial by Jury, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 693 (1981); Note, Has the Right
to a Jury Trial As Guaranteed Under the Seventh Amendment Become Outdated in Complex Civil
Litigation?, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 189 (1980); 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 506 (1980). The Seventh Circuit's apparent departure from summary judgment procedure in Weit, however, in no way rises to
the level of intellectual integrity of that ongoing debate since the Weit decision simply seems to
abrogate the right to any trial due to the complexity of the action, thereby denigrating both due
process and seventh amendment concerns for the sake of judicial expediency.
167. 649 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1981).
168. For a recent Supreme Court discussion of the offensive use of collateral estoppel, see
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-31 (1979).
169. 649 F.2d at 533. The Seventh Circuit interpreted Parklane Hosiery as imposing a threshold requirement for the application of collateral estoppel of a "full and fair opportunity" to liti-
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to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses was found to be insufficient
participation in that trial to support a finding that they had a "full and
fair opportunity" to litigate the conspiracy issue.' 70 Rather, the Seventh Circuit found that minimal due process guarantees require that a
defendant have an opportunity to present evidence and arguments
before a subsequent offensive use of collateral estoppel would be
7
deemed appropriate.' '
Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in ParklaneHosiery
Co. v. Shore, 72 federal trial courts are given broad discretion to determine the appropriate offensive uses of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 173 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Pinto Trucking establishes
some welcome and legitimate due process boundaries upon the exercise
of that discretion.
Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating, Inc.' 74 presented the
question of whether relief from a final judgment, entered pursuant to
stipulation, may be vacated pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 75 if it is based upon a "mistake" in communication
between a party's two attorneys. The Seventh Circuit answered that
question in the affirmative based upon its earlier decision of Bradford
Exchange v. Trein's Exchange. 76 Bradford held that rule 60(b) relief
from a judgment entered by consent is available to a party upon affirmative proof that his counsel was without authority to consent to entry
of the judgment. 77 In Smith, the court found such "affirmative proof"
in affidavits of the appellant's counsel which indicated that the appellant's consent to the judgment was entered pursuant to a misunderstanding between his two attorneys.' 78 The record, however, does not
clearly reveal the nature of the misunderstanding between the appellant's counsel. Nor did the appellant himself submit an affidavit explaining how the judgment entered by his local counsel was contrary to
his directions.
gate, which must be met before several other factors relevant to the application of collateral
estoppel should be considered. Id at 533 n.4.
170. Id at 532.
171. Id at 533.

172.
173.
174.
175.

439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id at 331.
627 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1980).
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in pertinent part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ....
176. 600 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1979).
177. Id at 102.
178. 627 F.2d at 796-97.
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As Judge Wood eloquently pointed out in his dissent, the type of
"affirmative proof" required by Bradford should not have been
deemed present in Smith. 179 For obvious and important reasons, rule
60(b) permits a final judgment to be disturbed only upon narrow
grounds. The rule of Bradford appears to adhere to the purpose of rule
60(b) only inasmuch as its "affirmative proof" requirement is read to
impose a burden upon the movant to unequivocally demonstrate that
counsel consented to entry of a judgment without the movant's authority. Ordinarily, Bradford would thus seem to mandate the production
of some form of testimonial evidence given by the party himself. 80
Otherwise, as asserted by the appellees in Smith, the rule of Bradford
could be subject to abuse by a party having post hoc misgivings about
his agreement to the entry of a consent judgment.' 8 ' The decision in
Smith may well have been correct based upon facts not disclosed in the
submissions accompanying the appellant's rule 60(b) motion; however,
as based upon those submissions, it sets an unwise precedent for the use
of rule 60(b) pursuant to the Bradford rule.
The final case addressed concerning the trial of actions is Reinders
Brothers, Inc. v. Rain Bird Eastern Sales Corp. 182 One of the issues
raised on appeal in Rain Bird was whether the district court's issuance
of a preliminary injunction should be reversed because it quashed, on
an ex parte basis, a subpoena to compel the attendance of one of the
defendant's witnesses at the preliminary injunction hearing. 8 3 The basis for the witness' motion to quash was that his attendance at the hearing would be inconvenient. While acknowledging that the ex parte
hearing of motions to quash is inappropriate, the Seventh Circuit declined in Rain Bird to reverse the district court's issuance of injunctive
184
relief on that basis.
The Seventh Circuit considered several factors as support for its
ruling, two of which are unconvincing. First, the Seventh Circuit
found, as support for its decision, that the motion to quash was necessarily heard on the sole business day between the service of the subpoena and commencement of the hearing since the witness'
inconvenience argument would be moot if heard at a later date. 85 The
179. Id at 801-03 (Wood, J., dissenting). Judge Wood also dissented from the majority holding in Bradford. 600 F.2d at 102-03 (Wood, J., dissenting).
180. See 627 F.2d at 801 (Wood, J., dissenting).
181. Id at 797.
182. 627 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1980).
183. Id at 51-52.
184. Id at 52.
185. Id
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obvious defect in this rationale is that the existence of but one day in
which to afford the witness' motion a meaningful hearing does not explain the district court's failure to require that notice be given the defendant and that it be given an opportunity to appear on that date.
In addition to the witness' presence, the subpoena sought the production of the same documents that the witness had refused to give the
defendant pursuant to a deposition conducted months before the hearing. The Seventh Circuit also considered as support for its ruling the
fact that the defendant did not seek to compel the production of those
documents after the deposition by filing an appropriate rule 37 motion.1 86 The Seventh Circuit concluded that "any prejudice flowing
from the district court's action was largely the result of defendant's own
conduct."' 87 This reasoning, however, is also without force. Nowhere
do the rules provide that once objection to a discovery request is made,
the party seeking discovery must make a motion to compel or forego
his right to subpoena production of the discovery material for use at a
18 8
hearing.
The other factors relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in affirming
the district court were: (1) because the defendant did not lodge an objection when it learned on the day of the hearing of the exparte quashing of its subpoena, it "tacitly accepted the district court's disposition of
the matter,"' 1 89 and (2) evidence sought to be produced by the subpoena would likely not have significantly strengthened the defendant's
defense. 190 The first of these is of questionable validity as support for
the court's decision and the second is asserted in rather conclusory
fashion.
As previously stated, the federal rules are structured so as to facilitate the determination of claims on the basis of records that have been
developed as completely as possible.' 9' Accordingly, a prospective witness properly served with a subpoena to appear at a hearing and to
bring requested documents should be able to avoid the command of the
subpoena on grounds of inconvenience only after a weighing by the
district court of the prejudice attendance will cause the prospective wit186. Id FED. R. Civ. P. 37 provides means for obtaining a court order compelling discovery
as well as sanctions for failure to comply with such an order.
187. 627 F.2d at 52.
188. Indeed, such a proposition is repugnant to the spirit of the federal rules. Cf. Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962) (holding that it is contrary to the spirit of the federal rules to
avoid a decision on the merits on the basis of a mere technicality).
189. 627 F.2d at 52.
190. Id
191. See text accompanying notes 95-100 supra.
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ness against the prejudice that his failure to attend will cause to the
party that issued the subpoena. 92 It is unfortunate that in Rain Bird
this important principle was ignored without adequate justification for
doing so. 193
CHOICE OF LAW

The Seventh Circuit this term rendered two decisions involving
choice of law problems, both of which deviated from settled choice of
law analysis. Choice of law problems typically present themselves in
the context of a claim brought under diversity jurisdiction. Federal
courts hearing claims pursuant to their diversity jurisdiction are bound
to apply state substantive law 94 and to determine which state's substantive law shall apply by looking to the choice of law principles of the
95

forum state. 1
The first such case, In re Air Crash DisasterNear Chicago, Illinois
on May 25, 1979,196 concerns the tragic May 25, 1979, air crash at Chicago's O'Hare airport involving a DC-10 aircraft. A host of wrongful
death actions ensued in federal district courts in several states and were
then transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the
Northern District of Illinois for consolidation for certain pretrial purposes. The issue underlying the choice of law problems presented in In
re Air Crash was the availability of punitive damages against the manufacturer and owner of the aircraft. A true conflict existed among those
97
states with an interest in the resolution of the punitive damages issue. 1
The lengthy and at times recondite opinion of the Seventh Circuit
in In re Air Crash is of precedential significance in a single respect: its
application of the choice of law analysis of the forum states of Illinois
192. See, e.g., United States v. 691.81 Acres, 443 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 71 F.R.D. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hadnott v. Amos, 291 F.
Supp. 309 (M.D. Ala. 1968), rev'd on olher grounds, 393 U.S. 904 (1969).
193. Other decisions of the Seventh Circuit this term addressing issues pertaining to the trial
of actions include: United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1980) (Silvern deadlock instruction must be given before jury retires if it is to be given upon deadlock. See United States v.
Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973)); Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1980) (grant of involuntary dismissal pursuant to rule 41(b) of discrimination claims), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 914 (1981); American Equip. Corp. v. Wikoma Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1980)
(consent judgment in patent infringement action must find both patent validity and infringement
to be given res judicata effect); Lightsey v. Harding, Dalm & Co., 623 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1980)
(finding of administrative agency not made pursuant to its statutory authority not entitled to collateral estoppel effect in subsequent judicial action), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
194. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
195. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
196. 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
197. Id at 608.
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and New York. Both of those states generally embrace the choice of
law principles found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of

Laws, 198 which provides that the place of injury governs tort law questions unless another state has a "more significant relationship" to the
occurrence giving rise to the action.' 99 Whether another state has a

"more significant relationship" so as to overcome the presumption in
favor of the place of injury is determined by examination of certain
types of interests and policy considerations as set forth in the
2
Restatement. 00
In evaluating the pertinent Restatement factors, the Seventh Circuit determined that two other states had a "more significant relationship" to the accident than did Illinois, the place of injury.20 ' The
Seventh Circuit further determined, however, that the relationships of

the other two states were equally significant. 202 Finding that no princi-

pled choice could be made between the two states with equally more
significant relationships to the accident than the place of injury, the
Seventh Circuit ruled that the law of the place of injury would
198. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969) provides:

Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its
own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable
rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969) provides:

The General Principles
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the
law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue.
201. 644 F.2d at 616.
202. Id at 615.
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govern. 203
This ruling is troublesome for two reasons. First, in view of the
numerous factors that the Restatement lists to be considered in determining the significance of a state's relationship to an occurrence, 20 4 the
Seventh Circuit's conclusion that two states' relationships were exactly
equal seems implausible. Second, assuming the existence of two states
with equally more significant relationships to an occurrence than that
of the place of injury, to then opt for application of the law of the place
of injury in effect scuttles the whole choice of law analysis of the Restatement. Notwithstanding this criticism, assuming that such equality
does exist among those interested states other than the place of injury,
the Seventh Circuit's ruling that the law of the place of injury shall
govern seems as prudent a path out of such a dilemma as any other that
suggests itself.
The second choice of law decision of the Seventh Circuit this term
was Pittway Corp. v. LockheedAircraft Corp.205 Pittway was an action

brought in tort by the purchaser of an airplane seeking to recover economic losses2° caused by certain defects. Pittway also involved the application of Illinois choice of law principles. Pitway is of interest
because the Seventh Circuit indicated in its opinion that the "place of
injury" with respect to a defective product causing only economic loss
is not necessarily the place the defect is discovered, but may well be
considered the place where the defendant manufacturer's business is
located or the place where the product was manufactured. 207 Lamentably, however, the Pittway decision does not offer a mode of analysis by
which the place of injury in such cases shall be definitively determined.
Pittway is also of note because the Seventh Circuit presumed,
without analysis or citation to authority, that Illinois tort law does not
permit the recovery of purely economic loss 208 when the only authority
on the question is two Illinois. appellate court decisions which reached
conflicting results. 20 9 Settled choice of law analysis provides that when
203. Id at 616.
204. See note 200 supra.
205. 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981).
206. Economic loss is defined as "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits--without any claim of personal injury
or damage to other property." Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966).
207. 641 F.2d at 527-28.
208. Id at 525.
209. Compare Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 I11. App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302
(1980) (economic loss recoverable in tort), with Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 IlL.
App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977) (economic loss not recoverable in tort).
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there is a division of authority among state courts, a federal court must
in a reasoned manner "ascertain" that state's law. 2 10 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit should have afforded the parties and other courts the benefit of
the analysis that led it to conclude that economic loss is not recoverable
under Illinois tort law.
APPELLATE REVIEW

With few exceptions, the rules governing the availability of appellate review are statutory. Generally, immediate review of a district
court order may be had in a court of appeals only if the order is a final
order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291211 or falls under the "collateral order" doctrine. 21 2 Also, an order finally disposing of a separate
claim within an action containing multiple claims is appealable if certified by the district court. 21 3 Certain kinds of interlocutory orders may
be appealed as of right, with the most notable example being orders
granting, denying or modifying injunctions.21 4 Certain other kinds of
21 5 Most of
interlocutory orders may be appealed on a permissive basis.
the rules governing the availability of appellate review are deemed to
be jurisdictional. 21 6 Therefore, they may not be waived and may be
2 17
asserted at any time.
During the 1980-81 term, the Seventh Circuit decided several cases
that touched upon questions pertaining to its appellate jurisdiction.
The treatment afforded these questions indicates that the Seventh Circuit is especially sensitive where its appellate jurisdiction is concerned.
While displaying such sensitivity, however, these decisions also reveal a
pragmatic willingness to occasionally relax jurisdictional constraints in
favor of appealability, especially when a strict adherence to jurisdictional constraints would make an erroneous decision at the district
court level final. To be sure, valid criticism can be leveled at such ad
210. Seegenerall, 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.308 (2d ed. 1981). For a good discussion of the duty of a federal court to ascertain state law where the highest court in the state has not
spoken, see McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 976 (1980). See also IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309 (2d ed. 1981).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States,. .. except where a direct review may be had in
the Supreme Court.
212. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
213. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
215.

See id § 1292(b).

216. See Diamond Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenues, 422 F.2d 532,
534 (8th Cir. 1970).
217. See United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 933 (7th Cir. 1975).
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hoc relaxation of rules of procedure in that it breeds uncertainty and is
contrary to notions of finality. Nonetheless, because the Seventh Circuit's decisions relaxing jurisdictional rules reflect either a concern for
the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources or a balancing of equitable principles, or both, one is hard-pressed to direct any vociferous
criticism at any of these decisions.
A motion to reconsider a district court's denial of a posttrial motion does not toll the running of an appeal period under the federal
rules. However, in Needham v. White Laboratories,Jnc.,218 the Seventh
Circuit held, in a split decision, that where the district court assured the
defendant that it did, with the result that the appeal was not timely
2 19
filed, the appeal would not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Private litigants are subject to a thirty-day period for the filing of appeals. 220 Pursuant to rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the timely filing of certain posttrial motions will toll the running
of the appeal period pending a disposition of the motion. 22 ' A motion
to reconsider the denial of a posttrial motion, however, will not toll the
running of the appeal period. 222 Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure prohibits a court of appeals from enlarging an ap223
peal period.
Needham avoided a technical application of the above rules by
relying upon an exception carved out by Thompson v. Immigration and
NaturalizationService.224 In Thompson, the Supreme Court found appellate jurisdiction proper pursuant to an untimely filed appeal where
the district court had assured the appellant that his filing of one of the
posttrial motions enumerated in rule 4(a) was timely, when in fact it
was not.225 The Seventh Circuit read Thompson for the proposition
that, when a litigant relies to the detriment of his right to appeal on an
improper interpretation by a district judge of the federal rules insofar
as they relate to the appeal period, the policies underlying a technical
application of those rules will give way to fairness concerns so that the
218. 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981).
219. Id at 398.
220. FED. R. App. P. 4(a).
221. Under FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), the motions which will toll the filing of the appeal period
are: (1) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to rule 50(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact pursuant to
rule 52(b); (3) a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to rule 59; and (4) a motion for
a new trial pursuant to rule 59.
222. Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 570 F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.

953 (1978).
223. FED. R. App. P. 26(b)(1).
224. 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam).
225. Id at 387.
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litigant's right to appeal is not forfeited. 226 Accordingly, because the
appellant in Needham would have presumably timely filed his appeal,
as would have the appellant in Thompson, but for the district court's
erroneous interpretation of the rules, the court found its appellate jurisdiction properly invoked.
Chief Judge Fairchild dissented from the Needham majority's assertion of appellate jurisdiction in part because he deemed Thompson
to be inapposite since in that case the appellant did an act which "if
227
properly done" would have tolled the running of the appeal period.
However, the majority's fair reading of Thompson renders this distinction immaterial. Rather, as stated, the controlling fact of Thompson
seems to be not the nature of the act performed by an appellant, but
instead an appellant's reliance upon a district court's erroneous interpretation of the effect of the act upon the appellant's right to appellate
review. Hence, as Chief Judge Fairchild intimates, the appellant's reliance arguably need not even be reasonable. Indeed, the unfortunate
aspect of Thompson and Needham is that they excuse counsel's own
seemingly inexcusable ignorance of the applicable federal rules.
Finally, it is noteworthy that upon reaching the substantive issues
raised in the appeal, the Seventh Circuit in Needham reversed the district judge. 228 Thus, to have ruled that the appellant had not timely
invoked the Seventh Circuit's appellate jurisdiction would have caused
not only the appellant's loss of his right to appeal, but would have immunized an erroneous decision from appellate review.
229
The scope of the right to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
was the subject of the appellate jurisdiction issue in Davis v. Ball Memorial Hospital Association.23O In Davis, classwide claims were as-

serted against several state defendants and the Secretary of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services charging that the
defendant hospital was violating the indigent care provisions of the
Hill-Burton Act 23 ' and that the federal defendant had failed to prop226. 639 F.2d at 398.

227. Id at 404 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting).
228. Id at 403.

229. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, .. except where a
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court; ....
230. 640 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1980).
231. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-I (1976 & Supp. II 1979). Participation in a federal funding
program by a health care institution pursuant to the Hill-Burton Act requires the participant to
provide "a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor." Id § 291c(e) (1976).
See also id. § 300o-3tb)(1)(J) (1976) (repealed 1979).
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erly discharge her duties under that act. 232 The plaintiff requested declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. Upon the federal
defendant's motion, she was dismissed from the lawsuit and thereafter
the plaintiff sought to immediately appeal the district court's dismissal
order.
Because dismissal of the federal defendant was not a final order
within the meaning of section 1291 and the district court refused to
certify the order as appealable under rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 233 the plaintiff's only arguable avenue of appellate review was section 1292(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit ruled that appealability pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) of an order dismissing less than all
of the defendants to an action seeking injunctive relief is determined by
"an appraisal of the significance to the action of the dropped party. ' 234
Since some of the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff could either
be provided only by the federal defendant or required the substantial
involvement of the federal defendant, the court held that its appellate
jurisdiction was properly invoked under section 1292(a)(1). 235
Davis thus reflects the Seventh Circuit's view that section
1292(a)(1) should be afforded a practical interpretation. In this regard
Davis is significant because the Seventh Circuit declined to extend the
reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner v. Westinghouse
BroadcastingCo. 236 to find that it was without jurisdiction to hear the
appeal in Davis.237 Gardner held that a denial of class certification in
an action seeking classwide permanent injunctive relief was not reviewable under section 1292(a)(1). 238 As to the argument that the denial of
class certification substantially denied the injunctive relief sought, the
Gardner Court reasoned that no ruling had been made on the merits of
the requested injunctive relief.239 In addition, the Court suggested that
because no preliminary injunctive relief was sought, interlocutory review was not necessary to avoid any irreparable injury. 240 Arguably,
the Gardner holding constricts the scope of section 1292(a)(1) so as to
232. Id § 300o-1(5) to (6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) directs the Secretary to adopt certain regulations implementing the Act.
233. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See note 251 infra for the text of the rule.
234. 640 F.2d at 35.
235. Id
236. 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
237. 640 F.2d at 36.
238. 437 U.S. at 480. In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the position of a majority of
courts of appeals that had decided the question. See Note, The Limits ofSection 1292(a)(7) Redefined;' Appealability ofthe Class Determination as an Order "Refuing an Injunction," 9 U. TOL. L.
REv. 488, 515 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Limits Redefned].
239. 437 U.S. at 480-81.
240. See id at 479 n.3.
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allow appeals only from orders that directly grant, deny or modify an
injunction. 24' Such an interpretation of Gardner would serve to foreclose interlocutory appeals in cases such as Davis. The Seventh Circuit
was careful in Davis, however, to limit the reach of Gardner precisely to
242
the class certification question decided in Gardner.
The Seventh Circuit's reading of Gardner was appropriate. To
read section 1292(a)(1) as generally applicable only to orders directly
affecting a request for injunctive relief, rather than to orders substantially affecting a request for injunctive relief, would seem, by exalting
form over substance, not to give full effect to Congress' intention in
enacting section 1292(a)(1). 24 3 Gardner-does to a certain extent embrace such a narrow view of section 1292(a)(1). 244 However, it does so
because the Court was principally concerned about the flood of appeals
that would result if immediate appeal were allowed from class certification determinations based upon the presence of a request for permanent injunctive relief.245 Class certification determinations are not
otherwise immediately appealable and are considered within the discretion of the district court. 246 Despite its concern with the proliferation of appeals, the Court reserved the question of whether a class
certification is appealable pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) where a re2 47
quest for preliminary injunctive relief is involved.
Other interesting questions concerning appellate jurisdiction were
considered in AmalgamatedMeat Cutters v. Thompson Farms Co. 248 In
Thompson Farms, the plaintiff filed an appeal, purportedly as of right,
from the district court's entry of summary judgment on certain claims
of the plaintiff. Apparently realizing that its appeal was defectivebecause not from a final order within the meaning of section 1291 or
from an order affecting any claim for injunctive relief within the meaning of section 1292(a)()--the plaintiff subsequently obtained an order
certifying the district court's entry of summary judgment for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 249 The plaintiff, however,
241. See Limits Redefined, supra note 238, at 515-16.
242. 640 F.2d at 35-36. Again, it is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit, after deciding
that it had appellate jurisdiction, reversed in part the district court's order. Id at 43.
243. See Limits Redefned, supra note 238, at 515-16.
244. Id at 515.
245. 437 U.S. at 481-82.
246. 640 F.2d at 35-36.
247. 437 U.S. at 479 n.3.
248. 642 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir. 1981).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an

CHICAGO KENT LW REVIEW

did not then file a new notice of appeal, but relied upon its previously
250
filed notice as its asserted basis for appellate jurisdiction.
The first problem pertaining to appellate jurisdiction presented in
Thompson Farms arose from the fact that, while appeal from the summary judgment order was sought pursuant to section 1292(b), the order
was properly appealable only pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 1 Because the summary judgment order
finally disposed of claims separate from the plaintiff's other claims, it
was the proper subject of a rule 54(b) appeal. 25 2 On the other hand,
because no notice of appeal was filed within ten days of the section
1292(b) certification, that statute could not confer appellate
253
jurisdiction.
Courts of appeals have generally demanded that a district court
order finally disposing of a separate claim within the meaning of rule
54(b) contain language expressly directing the entry of judgment on
that claim before an appeal from the disposition of that claim will be
allowed pursuant to rule 54(b). 25 4 The purpose of the requirement is to
afford litigants a clear signal as to the commencement of the effects of a
formal entry of judgment. 25 5 Such language was not contained in the
district court's order in Thompson Farms. Nonetheless, while recognizing the merit of requiring that rule 54(b) certification orders set forth
the language contained in the rule and, furthermore, recognizing that
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided,however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
250. 642 F.2d at 1068.
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than al
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry ofjudgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
252. 642 F.2d at 1069. Thompson Farms offers a detailed discussion of "separateness" for rule

54(b) purposes. Id at 1070.
253. Id at 1069. Moreover, as noted by the Seventh Circuit, there is a certain inconsistency to
viewing an order that is "final" within the meaning of rule 54(b) as "interlocutory" within the
meaning of § 1292(b). Id at 1069 n.4.
254. Eg., In re Licek Potato Chip Co., 599 F.2d 181, 185 (7th Cir. 1979). See generally 10 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2660 (1973).
255. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950).
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the specific focuses of rule 54(b) and section 1292(b) are distinct, the
Seventh Circuit with a pragmatic eye viewed the district court's section
1292(b) certification order as a rule 54(b) certification for purposes of
the plaintiff's appeal. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the primary
purposes of section 1292(b) and rule 54(b) are identical---4.e., "to accelerate appellate review of select portions of litigation" 2 56-and that no
2 57
prejudice would result if the appeal were allowed.
Another obstacle to the Seventh Circuit's appellate jurisdiction in
Thompson Farms was erected by the fact that the district court's certification order was not entered until after the filing of the notice of appeal. The order was therefore arguably entered after the district court
had been divested of its jurisdiction over the claims appealed from.
Ordinarily, the filing of a notice of appeal divests a district court of
jurisdiction over the matter appealed from. 258 As the Seventh Circuit
noted, however, that rule "has always been shot through with exceptions where a fair construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
so requires. ' 259 On concededly pragmatic grounds, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that a district court has jurisdiction to certify an order for a rule
54(b) appeal after a notice of appeal from the order has already been
filed. 260 To do otherwise, by dismissing the appeal and requiring the
appellant to refile, would in the words of the court result in "empty
paper shuffling."'26 1 Upon reaching the merits, the Seventh Circuit va2 62
cated the district court's entry of summary judgment.
In sum, recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit display an approach to questions of appellate jurisdiction that favors appellate review over a formalistic construction of rules of appellate procedure
whenever the conduct of the defaulting party has not been egregious
and no undue prejudice will result. This seems to be particularly true
whenever a formalistic construction of its appellate jurisdiction would
shield an erroneous decision at the district court level from appellate
review. 263
256. 642 F.2d at 1071.
257. Id at 1071-72.
258. See, e.g., In re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1955).
259. 642 F.2d at 1073.
260. Id at 1075.
261. Id at 1074.
262. Id at 1076.
263. Other cases concerning appellate jurisdiction decided by the Seventh Circuit this term
are: Bradford Exchange v. Trein's Exchange, 644 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1981) (in a non-common
fund trademark infringement action, an order awarding attorney's fees is nonappealable until
entry of final judgment on the merits); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 643 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981)
(order granting motion to recuse not appealable as a final order or pursuant to mandamus);
United States v. Elrod, 627 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1980) (order staying district court proceedings pend-
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CONCLUSION

To discern any specific policy or trend in the area of civil procedure based upon the above decisions would be a difficult task. This is
so, in part, because civil procedure issues are always infused with the
consideration and resolution of the particular substantive issues
involved.
Broadly speaking, the aim of civil procedure should be to achieve
a fair harmony between the primary goal of the disposition of claims
on their merits and the secondary goal of certainty and efficiency in
judicial administration. For the most part, the chords struck by the
decisions of the Seventh Circuit in the 1980-81 term in the area of civil
procedure achieve such a harmony.*

ing exhaustion of primary jurisdiction vested in administrative body is a final order within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)); Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1980) (a decision with
respect to a claim for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (amended 1980) is one distinct
from a decision on the merits and therefore may be reviewed only by a notice of appeal specifying
an appeal from the order deciding the fee question).
* On February 24, 1982, the United States Supreme Court in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), affirmed Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 630 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1980), and reversed In re Consolidated Pretrial
Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978). Both cases are discussed in text
accompanying notes 4-18 supra. Zipes held that a timely filing with the EEOC is no' a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a Title VII suit. 102 S. Ct. at 1132. Rather, the EEOC filing requirement is like a statute of limitations and is, therefore, subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable
tolling. Id. at 1133-35. The Supreme Court acknowledged, but in no way felt bound by, its repeated references to the EEOC filing requirement as "jurisdictional." Id. at 1133. See also text
accompanying note 14 supra. The Court's holding is certainly correct, however, given the remedial scheme of Title VII, the relatively short EEOC filing period (180 days), and the fact that
EEOC charges are typically filed by lay persons. 102 S. Ct. at 1134.

